Introduction
Concern with education animates Plato's works: in the Apology, Socrates describes his life's mission of practising philosophy as aimed at getting the Athenians to care for virtue (29d-e, 31b); in the Gorgias, he claims that happiness depends entirely on education and justice (470e); in the Protagoras and Meno he puzzles about whether virtue is teachable or how else it might be acquired; in the Phaedrus he explains that teaching and persuading require knowledge of the soul and its powers, which requires knowledge of what objects the soul may act upon and be acted upon by, which in turn requires knowledge of the whole of nature (277b-c, 270d); in the Laws the Athenian Stranger says that education is the most important activity (803d), and that the office of director of state education is the most important office of the state (765d-e). Each of Plato's two longest works, the Laws and Republic, tirelessly details a utopian educational programme. And Plato's outlook on the arts (poetry, theatre, music, painting) is dominated by considerations of whether they help or hinder correct education. 1 To bring Plato's vast and multifaceted concern with education into focus it will be helpful to begin by looking through the lens of his differences with those he styles Socrates' educational rivals: sophists like Protagoras, teachers of rhetoric like Gorgias, and ultimately poets like Homer. Plato sees the differences between these educators and
Socrates not only as a difference over what subject-matter is worth learning, but also as a difference over the nature of would-be learners' powers to learn. By understanding these differences we will gain insight into the motivation for Plato's positive educational 2 proposals in the Republic and Laws. 2 For Plato's educational proposals go hand-in-hand with his psychology: 3 his distinctive account of human capacities to learn specifies the good human condition at which his educational proposals aim.
Socrates and the rival educators
The 5 th and 4 th centuries were a period of great intellectual and cultural productivity in Athens, but at the same time, élite Athenians came to see a need for an education beyond the traditional immersion in culture and military training. We find ample evidence of this in the writings of Isocrates in the 4 th century, but also in the phenomenon, well-documented by Plato, of itinerant teachers in a variety of subjects, most importantly in persuasive speaking, flocking to Athens during Socrates' lifetime. A number of factors can explain this new interest in education beyond the traditional.
Athenian political life had changed radically through the 5 th century, with reforms in democratic institutions making possible greater popular participation (for example, jury duty and assembly attendance were now compensated for by a day's wage), at the same time as Athens' imperial pursuits greatly complicated its political affairs. Would-be political leaders now had to communicate effectively with a wider cast of people than previously, and on a wider range of affairs. Now successful political leadership called for expertise in public speaking; expertise in military strategy, once a prerequisite for leadership, became dispensable (cf. Aristotle, Politics 1305a11-15).
The teachers
The teachers who came to Athens to meet this new demand promised tomorrow's politicians the means to personal and political success. According to Plato, Protagoras claimed to teach 'sound deliberation, both in domestic matters-how best to manage 3 one's household, and in public affairs-how to realize one's maximum potential for success in political debate and action , and Gorgias claimed to teach 'oratory' (Gorgias 449a), that is, 'the ability to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, councillors in a council meeting, and assemblymen in an assembly or in any other political gathering that might take place' (452e). 4 An expertise in public speaking could involve a great many subordinate subjects: in the Phaedrus, Socrates attributes to figures such as Protagoras and Gorgias the identification of many different elements of a successful speech, such as correct diction, indirect praise and censure, preambles and recapitulations, claims to plausibility, and so on (267d-69c). We can also plausibly take as subordinate to an expertise in persuasive speaking Protagoras' expertise in literary criticism, grammar and diction (Plato, Protagoras 339a; Aristotle, Rhetoric 1407b6-9, Sophistical Refutations 165b20-21, Poetics 1456b8-18), the production of arguments for contradictory conclusions, (Diogenes Laertius IX.52, 55, cf. Plato Sophist 232d) and epistemology--he is still famous for the doctrine, 'man is the measure of all things'
(Theaetetus 151e). 5 Plato's take on the market in higher education in the Athens of Socrates' day 6 is clear from the beginning of the Protagoras: the merchandise is potentially dangerous, and the eager buyers but poor judges of the value of what they are getting. Protagoras' prospective student Hippocrates tells Socrates of his desire to study with Protagoras to receive 'a gentleman's education' (rather than to become a professional sophist himself), in response to which Socrates warns, when you go to a teacher, you hand your soul over to him. But while when you buy food in the marketplace you can take it away and test it before eating it, 4 you cannot carry teachings away in a separate container. You put down your money and take the teaching away in your soul by having learned it, and off you go, either helped or injured. (314b)
It is dangerous to study with a sophist not just because you might be throwing away your money, but because you might end up with a damaged soul.
But how could studying with a sophist damage your soul? One might think that it is because the sophists corrupt their students by teaching them such things as that what goes by the name 'justice' is a convention established by the weak to control the strong (Gorgias 483b-84a), or by the strong to control the weak . 7 Yet when Plato discusses these supposedly corrupting views, he does not put them in the mouths of the teachers who are the targets of his criticisms, such as Gorgias and Protagoras. 8 Instead, he puts the charge that the sophists corrupt the young in the mouth of Anytus (Meno 91c-92e) and shows that it is, like Anytus' charge that Socrates in particular corrupts the young (Apology 24c-25c), based on ignorance and unconcern for the truth. In the Republic Socrates generalizes the point and says that those who charge the sophists with corrupting the young are themselves the real corrupters (indeed, they are 'the greatest sophists'), when they sit together in assemblies, courts, theatres, and other public gatherings, collectively praising some and blaming others (492a-c). As a result, give of these terms. (493a-c).
Let us grant, then, that the sophists are not the source of corruption but merely reflectors of popular opinion, and that the real source of corruption is the opinion of the crowd.
Our question can be sharpened: if all the sophists teach is popular opinion, how does studying with them make one worse off than not studying with anyone at all?
The Republic passage quoted above faults the sophists on two counts: first, they do not know whether the popular convictions they reflect are fine or shameful, good or bad, just or unjust (cf. Gorgias 454e, 461b), and second, they call the ability they teach--to tell which are the convictions of the majority and presumably to use these convictions to persuade the audience of some particular course of action--'wisdom'. The sophists do not differ from the average Athenian in holding ignorant opinions about the fine, good, and just, but it is the sophists who make ignorant opinion intellectually respectable instead of acknowledging that it is a shortcoming. So, for example, Protagoras argues that what appears to be true to each subject is true for that subject (Theaetetus 152a,160c). And Gorgias brags that rhetoric enables one to persuade an audience on any subject whatsoever even more effectively than the expert on that subject could-and without having to bother to learn the subject oneself 459e For his own part, Socrates denies that he is any kind of teacher (Apology 33a-b).
He does not charge fees as do the sophists, 16 but there is also a deeper reason: lacking knowledge of virtue, 17 he cannot teach others, not even if his own beliefs (e.g. 28b-d, 29b) are true-which they might be as a result of luck or divinity, or of extensive elenctic self-examination. 18 Of course he has, or tries to have, an effect on his interlocutors in discussion, at the very least showing them that their beliefs are inconsistent and as a consequence that they have intellectual work to do. This is not teaching, however, for teaching he glosses as 'producing conviction with knowledge', which he contrasts not only with rhetoric ('producing conviction without knowledge') but also with inquiry, his own practice of refutation aimed at clarifying the subject at hand and rooting out false beliefs (Gorgias 454c-55a, 458a).
Now as long as elenchus produces only puzzlement, it can be contrasted with both teaching and rhetoric, since it produces no conviction (save that one is ignorant), but once elenchus identifies certain beliefs as false, it seems to be producing a conviction, namely, that such-and-such beliefs are false. This characterization of elenchus' results raises a famous problem about how showing that someone's beliefs are inconsistent with one another can help to eliminate their false beliefs (which of the inconsistent beliefs are they to reject?) and how consistency among beliefs attests to their truth (why couldn't a set of false beliefs be internally consistent?) 19 In the Gorgias Socrates also attributes to interlocutors beliefs that they do not say they have, even beliefs they expressly deny having (466d-e, 474b-c, 495e, 516d). One possible explanation for this is that Socrates attributes these beliefs to interlocutors on the grounds that they are entailed by beliefs the interlocutors hold explicitly. In this case, we might expect that he would attribute false as well as true beliefs to his interlocutors, because surely some false beliefs are entailed by the beliefs his interlocutors hold explicitly. In fact, however, it is in particular true beliefs that Socrates attributes to them-which may call for the more extravagant hypothesis that he attributes true beliefs to interlocutors on the grounds of a doctrine that these truths are innate, perhaps to be recollected. This brings us to our next topic, the students.
The students
Gorgias' Encomium of Helen purports to demonstrate the power of persuasion by exculpating the universally blamed Helen of Troy; internal to the speech too are claims about the force or magic by which speech sways its audience (8-15): words become bearers of pleasure and banishers of pain; for, merging with opinion in the soul, the power of incantation beguiles it and persuades it and alters it by witchcraft. Of witchcraft and magic twin arts have been discovered, which are errors of the soul and deceptions of opinion. (10) According to Gorgias, our poor epistemic condition makes us dependent on opinion, and opinion is vulnerable to persuasion, which 'when added to speech can impress the soul as it wishes'; we can see this in the way in which meteorologists, skilled speechwriters, and philosophers influence their audiences' opinions (13). Indeed, he says, although 'the mode of persuasion is in no way like that of necessity,' 'its power is the same,' (12), for 'the effect of speech upon the structure of soul is as the structure of drugs over the nature of bodies' (14). 20 That Plato thinks that there may be something to Gorgias' account of the soul as epistemically deprived and so as impressionable by persuasion is suggested by Socrates'
report of a wise man saying that 'the part of the soul in which our appetites reside is actually the sort of thing to be open to persuasion and to shift back and forth' (Gorgias 493a). In the Republic, Plato seems to accept that Gorgias' characterization of the soul as a whole does accurately characterize the non-rational parts of the soul. 21 So Socrates describes musical and gymnastic education's effects on the soul using images from metallurgy (410d-11b) and dyeing wool (429c-30b), and says that pre-rational souls are 'most malleable and take on any pattern one wishes to impress' on them (Republic 377a-b, cf. Laws 664a). 22 We will consider the non-rational parts of the soul at greater length in section 3; for the moment, however, we should note that the characterization of the non-rational elements in the soul as easily persuaded (malleable, able to be dyed any colour) is highly cognitive, attributing to them the capacity for something like belief or appearance.
Plato's real difference with Gorgias lies in his conception of reason. Whereas
Gorgias boasts that persuasion 'can impress the soul as it wishes' by means of a force akin to that of witchcraft (13) Reason's powers are not content-neutral, as Gorgias imagines. Rather, just as sight is a power to grasp visible contents, reason is a power to grasp intelligible ones-which is why it needs only to be directed appropriately in order to learn. By contrast with the 'socalled virtues of the soul', which 'really aren't there beforehand but are added later by habit and practice', the virtue of reason seems to belong above all to something more divine, which never loses its power but is always useful and beneficial or useless and harmful, depending on the way it is turned (Republic 518d-19a).
Just how this power to learn works varies across dialogues. In the Republic, reason has a desire-to know the truth-that is fulfilled by knowledge (581b). Elsewhere, Socrates suggests that the immortal soul, having acquired knowledge in its disincarnate state, can recollect this knowledge when incarnated, for example, when we are asked the right sorts of questions, or when we judge that sensible particulars are deficient in the possession of some property, or when an experience of beauty reminds us of the form of Beauty (Meno 81b-86b, cf. Phaedo 72e-76d, Phaedrus 246d-50e). 23 While the Republic's idea of the mind as a power requiring appropriate direction differs in detail from Plato's doctrine(s) of recollection, according to which when we learn we are reminding ourselves of truths latent in our minds, the two have in common the rejection of Gorgias' implicit conception of the soul and consequently the rejection of his conception of education. Whatever its exact nature, reason's power to grasp the truth is such that it needs not a teacher to pour doctrines into it, but instead some stimulus to inquiry, whether a questioner like Socrates or conflicting experiences that summon the understanding (Republic 523c-24d).
Plato's difference with Protagoras is subtler. According to Protagoras, Zeus gave all humans justice and a sense of shame (Protagoras 322c-d); however, those who live in cities are much more virtuous than those who do not (327c-d), because cities educate their citizens by the processes discussed above (section 2.1). Now Protagoras does conceive of human beings as having a capacity for virtue rather than as being purely blank and impressionable. However, he characterises this capacity as purely receptive:
we learn what is fine and base, good and bad, from living and literary examples and from the example of the laws. How do we determine whether a new case is similar to or different from the cases we have learned? Do we generalise? Do we somehow pick up underlying principles? While Protagoras is silent about these vital questions, Plato attempts to answer them by describing the powers, objects and activity of reason.
Utopian Education
As much as Plato's Republic is a defense of justice against Glaucon's challenge to show how justice, and not only its consequences, is in our interest, it is equally a work on education, and to see this, we only need follow Socrates' interlocutor Adeimantus through the dialogue. Adeimantus remarks about Glaucon's challenge, 'The most important thing to say hasn't been said yet' (362d), and goes on to explain: the things conventionally said in praise of justice in fact undermine its claim to intrinsic value because they praise the good consequences of appearing to be just, such as high reputation and all that derives from this, and favour from the gods (362e-63e); further, poets and ordinary people alike say that justice is hard and injustice sweet, and they willingly honour unjust people and declare them happy; finally, they say that the gods can be bribed so as not to punish unjust deeds (363e-64c). Adeimantus raises a general concern about the effects of cultural environment on values, and-by contrast with
Glaucon's immoralist challenge, which may be written off as purely theoretical shades easily into immoralism. While Socrates' description of the ideal constitution is likely a response to Thrasymachus' observation that all existing constitutions serve the interests of their rulers (338d-e), his long treatment of the education that produces just citizens (376c-415d) and just individuals (including the perfectly just philosopher-rulers, 514a-40c) is a response to Adeimantus' concern--indeed, it is at Adeimantus' urging that
Socrates describes the education of the guardians at all (376c-d).
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Before we turn to the details of Plato's educational proposals, it may be helpful to have a synoptic view of the whole educational programme of the Republic, and to that end, here is a table.
STAGE EDUCATION
First, when the soul is most malleable 
Musical Education
Education begins, Socrates says in the Republic, with stories told to young, impressionable children. The education is designed for guardian-children, and it is unclear whether the producing class will receive any part of this education, but it would seem difficult (and pointless) to exclude them: to know their place in society they would need to hear the Noble Lie (414b-15d); some of them might turn out to be guardian material (415a-c); in any case, if the goal of the city is, as Socrates says repeatedly, to make the city as a whole as happy as possible, and if education is the route to happiness, it would make no sense to deprive them of any education they are capable of benefiting from. He argues that women in the ideal city ought to be educated in the same way as men also on the grounds that this makes them as good as possible.
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Socrates says the stories told to the young are 'false on the whole, though they have some truth in them.' (377a) This requirement that stories have 'some truth' is vague. Socrates says that children should not hear stories that would cause them to take into their souls beliefs which are 'opposite to the ones they should hold when they are grown up' (377b) and proceeds to censor the verses of Homer, Hesiod and others on the basis of the vicious behaviour these verses attribute to the gods and hence license for humans. In any case, Socrates lacks knowledge about the virtues. As a result, it may seem that musical education is only concerned with mind-and behaviour-control and not at all with truth.
Yet the truth is the foremost concern in musical education. For example, Socrates' criteria for judging stories about the gods are (1) what is pious (which presumably requires accuracy about the gods), (2) what is advantageous to us (which may, since the god is good, be a proxy for truth), and (3) what is consistent (380b-c). Socrates seems to assume that these criteria, which could in principle conflict, converge. 27 His 'patterns for . . . stories about the gods' (379a) follow from the hypothesis of god's goodness: first, since nothing good is harmful, and nothing that is not harmful can do harm, and nothing that does no harm can do or be the cause of anything bad, it follows that a god is not the cause of bad things; on the other hand, since good things are beneficial or the cause of doing well, a god is the cause of good things (379b-c). Again, since the best things are most resistant to change, the gods would not want to change, for that would be to make themselves worse (380e-81c). Finally, being perfectly good, the gods have no need of falsehoods, no need to change or deceive anyone; instead, they hate falsehoods (382d-3a).
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In this discussion Plato focusses not on the truth of statements but rather on the truth or falsehood of the beliefs that people form on the basis of statements, for it is beliefs that influence actions and form characters, virtuous or vicious. Thus Socrates dismisses the observation that the stories he is banning come out true if read allegorically:
'the young can't distinguish what is allegorical from what isn't, and the opinions they absorb at that age are hard to erase and apt to become unalterable.' (378d) To know how to read a poem allegorically one would need to have an independent grasp of the truths that one hopes to find in the poem; these poems, however, are people's first teachers.
Hearing stories and taking them to be true is the most obvious of mechanisms by which opinions are impressed in the soul. The human being to be educated is a desirer after happiness, and he looks to the gods and heroes for both excusing precedents (391e) and positive ideas about how to seek happiness. Listening to traditional stories about Zeus a listener might reason, Zeus is good and lives the most blessed life, so it cannot be contrary to happiness to be led by one's lusts or to harm one's father and so it cannot harm me to do these things-I am just doing as Zeus does. Or he might reason, satisfying one's lusts and acting on one's anger are part of what living a happy life involves-look at Zeus! Although the focus of the discussion is on eliminating passages that might lead people astray, Socrates sometimes retains a verse to prescribe behaviour.
For example, to model the virtue of self-control, he includes the passage about Odysseus 'exhibiting endurance in the face of everything' when he controls his angry impulse to slaughter his maids as they carouse with Penelope's suitors (390d).
Imitation may be a separate mechanism by which people acquire opinions. As a prelude to his prohibition on guardians taking on the roles of vicious or weak characters
(leaving it open whether they will play any parts at all appearance ' (394b-c) . 30 The evidence is not conclusive whether Plato thinks that we have a basic propensity to imitate (seen perhaps in the way babies mimic facial expressions) which is not (at least initially) hooked up to our happiness-seeking behaviour, or whether he just thinks that we imitate those we regard as happy. Socrates says that one can't help but imitate the things we associate with and admire (500c), but this makes admiration a precondition of imitation, and Plato may well think that we admire those whom we think are happy.
The mechanisms by which poetry can affect the soul are also illuminated by
Socrates' account of the divided soul in Republic X. He contrasts an inferior part of the soul, which persists in believing appearances despite the witness of measurement, with the part of the soul that 'puts its trust in measurement and calculation' (602e-603a), obeys the law, and commands us to deal with our misfortunes by fixing them as best we can rather than grieving over them (604b-c). 31 If we are decent, we are ordinarily able to keep in check the desires of the inferior part of our soul for 'the satisfaction of weeping and wailing', desires it has 'by nature'. 32 Yet when we watch a tragic performance, for example one in which a supposedly great man grieves excessively for the loss of his son, we think that we may relax rational control over the inferior part, on the grounds that 21 there is no shame involved in praising and pitying the grieving character (after all, it is not ourselves but another person we are praising and pitying), and because doing so gives us pleasure. 33 The effect of this, however, is to make it difficult to control our desire to grieve when we ourselves suffer (606a-b).
We might wonder why pitying a character in a play should affect our real-life attitudes, but Plato suggests that the attitude we have to the character in the play is also a real-life attitude. The reason we allow ourselves to pity him, i.e., to share in his lamentation is not that we say to ourselves, 'no harm done; it's only a play', but rather, 'it's not me and mine I'm lamenting, so there's no shame attached.' So we already believe 'the loss of a son is a terrible thing', and, inconsistently, 'it's shameful to lament the loss of my own son'-and because the theater presents us with the loss of a son not our own, we deem our shame-response irrelevant and indulge our desire to grieve.
Socrates attributes the desire to grieve to the inferior part of the soul, the beliefs of which follow appearances and are unresponsive to reasoning, calculation, and measurement. 34 The indifference of the non-rational part(s) of the soul to truth suggests that the musical education's concern with the truth of beliefs about value is really a forward-looking concern for when the soul's rational powers develop; the truth of beliefs about value does not engage any power or propensity of the non-rational part(s). Further, the non-rational part(s) may not respond to considerations such as that grieving on behalf of a tragic character brought pleasure but no shame whereas grieving on one's own behalf brings shame and interferes with future-directed deliberation. Plato does not ban painting--even though, for example, a painter who knows nothing about carpentry can paint a representation of a carpenter that children and fools mistake for a real carpenter when it is distant enough (598b-c). 39 It is true that paintings are like poems in being imitations, and that imitations are inferior to the things they imitate. But
Socrates uses this point not to banish all imitations but to argue, against those who think that the poets 'know all crafts, all human affairs concerned with virtue and vice, and all about the gods' (598d-e), that producers of imitations cannot be teachers. For if they could produce virtuous deeds they would not devote themselves to producing imitations of them in poetry (599a-b); and as it happens, they have no good laws, successful wars, inventions in the crafts or sciences, ways of life, or virtuous individuals to their credit (599d-600c).
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It is a much-debated question how the banning of imitative poetry in Republic X (595a) compares to the restrictions on poetry in Republic III (to which Republic X refers). Clearly the ban on representations of vicious behaviour (Republic X) is more extensive than the ban on guardians' playing the parts of vicious characters (Republic III, 395c), but the representation of vice-in all the arts, not just in poetry-was already 23 banned in Republic III (401b). Finally, the only poetry admitted into the city is 'hymns to the gods and eulogies to good people' (607a). This, it seems, is the poetry Plato thinks could be informed by the knowledge of forms that Socrates says must underwrite and be the goal of a proper education. This is the same type of poetry that the Phaedrus describes as divinely inspired by a madness that comes as a gift from the gods, one of its powers being to awaken the soul to a 'Bacchic frenzy of songs and poetry that glorifies the achievements of the past and teaches them to future generations' (244a-45a).
Many have challenged Plato: even if the poets have no knowledge of the truth, and can only reflect back to their audience the uninformed opinions that circulate in society (602a-b), surely poets can also raise critical questions about these opinions? The problem with this is that poetry provides no resources to answer these questions other than opinion all over again. What help can poetry give to a reader of Sophocles'
Antigone who wonders, 'What is justice, after all? My former answers, obedience to the law or the king, and upholding the traditional customs, conflict!' Plato can offer at least a way ahead, dialectic.
Mathematical and Dialectical Education
While the goal of musical education is that citizens acquire true beliefs about how he offers these as accounts of courage or justice, he will find that they turn out to be courageous or just in some cases, but cowardly or unjust in others. As a result of being repeatedly refuted, Socrates says in the Republic, he will start to believe that 'the fine is no more fine than shameful, and the same with the just, the good, and the things he honored most'; he will lose his former commitments; and even philosophy will lose its standing in his eyes (Republic 538c-39a, 539c).
Avoiding asking 'what is . . .?' questions is not an option. If it is a natural power of the soul to ask such questions, then an education that thwarts or even ignores it will not be a good education. Further, Socrates says that there are certain experiences in which our conflicting judgments 'summon the understanding'-make us ask, in other words, about the qualities we ascribe to things, what they are. If the same object appears great or small depending on what it is seen next to, the soul is puzzled-how can the same thing be great and small, these being opposite qualities? The soul then summons the understanding to inquire: are the great and the small distinct? What is the great? What is the small? (523b-24d).
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Number is such a summoner: from the point of view of sense-experience, each thing is both one and many, but, since one and many are opposite qualities, this puzzles the soul. This is why the study of arithmetic and calculation reliably summon the understanding, turning our attention away from counting particulars given to us in experience and towards number itself, which can be grasped only in thought. So the 25 study of mathematics, apart from influencing the orderly ranks warriors must observe, turns potential philosophers from becoming to being (525b-c). Likewise, geometry, plane and solid, astronomy that seeks out the true motions approximated by the observable heavenly bodies (529c-30c), and harmonics pursued by way of 'problems' (531b-c), all 'purify' and 'rekindle' the soul's most valuable instrument (527d-e), making it easier to see the form of the good (526e). Finally, the different mathematical studies must be integrated and consolidated to 'bring out their association and relationship with one another' (531c-d). These mathematical studies are preparatory for dialectic, but they are also intrinsically good for the soul. 43 Properly practiced, dialectic uses reason alone to find the being of each thing and continues until the understanding grasps the good itself (532a-b); it enables the student to
give an irrefutable account of the being of each thing, including of the good (534b); it produces an understanding of how all the subjects formerly studied fit together into a unified whole (537c); finally, unlike the mathematical disciplines, it achieves unhypothetical knowledge (533c-d). Socrates describes the good grasped at the culmination of dialectic as the cause of both our power to know and of the truth of what is knowable. (508d-e) Many scholars see the grasp of the good as a kind of direct acquaintance with a self-certifying or self-evident first principle from which all the forms may be derived. But it can also be seen as a synoptic understanding of a coherent teleological structure of which the forms are parts. 44 In either case, prior to grasping the good which is the condition of unhypothetical knowledge, students have their dialectical studies interrupted by a fifteen-year practical experience requirement, the point of which seems to be to ensure that future rulers are at least the equals of their fellow-citizens in experience and that they remain steadfast in their values (539e-40a). Unlike the other studies, the practical experience requirement does not seem to contribute to knowledge of the form of the good, but rather only to competence in political rule.
At the level of the individual soul, knowledge of the good is a perfection of reason and, Socrates says, in addition to providing reason its characteristic pleasure of knowing the truth, allows the non-rational parts of the soul 'the truest pleasures possible for them' (586d-e). But Socrates says that even the truest pleasures of the non-rational parts are inferior in truth-they fill us up with 'what is never the same, and mortal'-and puritythey follow or are followed by pain (585b-d). Their presence in a virtuous life seems to be more a matter of making the best of bodily and psychological necessity than of realizing any perfectible powers of the non-rational parts.
Plato's Last Thoughts
Aristotle reports in the Politics that the Republic and Laws set out the same programme of education (II.6.1265a6-8) . This is a surprising claim, in view of the prominence in the Laws of striking educational institutions absent from the Republic, such as the use of the Laws itself as a teaching text (811c-e), drinking parties to test and reinforce the education of old men in self-control and modesty (645d-49d, 665c-66d, 671b-e), and persuasive preambles to the laws (719e-23c) 45 . But Aristotle may not regard the last as part of an educational programme, and he may regard the former two as minor innovations. Certainly the Athenian's initial description of education echoes
Socrates' description of musical education in the Republic: education channels a young child's pleasures and pains towards the right things before he can understand the reason 27 why, so that when he later comes to understand, his reason and his emotions agree, virtue being a harmony between reason and emotion (Laws 653b, cf. Republic 401c-2a).
We may approach the question of how similar or different the Laws' educational proposals are to the Republic's by considering again how these educational proposals reflect, and are guided by, a conception of the soul that is to be educated. We may inquire whether or not any institutional differences we find reflect a difference in Plato's conception of the soul's powers to learn, and also whether or not institutionally identical educational proposals are described in terms that indicate a new conception of how they work on the soul to produce virtue. We cannot do all this here, but we can make a preliminary exploration.
A second table, on the educational curriculum prescribed in the Laws, will allow us to consider at a glance a rather long-winded discussion:
STAGE EDUCATION
Prenatal-3 years Movement (788d-93e) 3-6 Play, wrestling, dancing (814e-16e), music ?-until they are old enough for the Chorus of Apollo?
Choral singing and dancing (in the chorus of the Muses)
?from the time they are 'tiny tots' at play Arithmetic, to be followed by geometry and astronomy (819b-22c) is all this unruly internal movement that calls for external movement (e.g. being carried about, dancing) to calm down the young soul (790c-d) and make it orderly. But we might note that the source of disorder is not purely 'internal': according to the Timaeus, senseperceptions too cause unruly movements; the real cause of the soul's disorderly motion is embodiment (43a-c). In any case, the importance given to movement in the Laws accompanies Plato's new interest in the soul as the source of motion and so as a selfmover (Laws 895a-96a, cf. Phaedrus 245c-e).
Musical education in the Laws is aimed like musical education in the Republic at cultivating citizens' virtue; nevertheless, the Laws' discussion of musical education says little about the belief-content required for this virtue. The Athenian does make the general point that poets and everybody else in the city must affirm that the best life is the most pleasant (662b-64b) and that the criterion of correctness in music-since music involves making likenesses and imitation-is accuracy in representing its model, beauty So far, we have seen a difference in emphasis: although both works insist on the importance of both doctrinal truth and enjoyment of true value, where the Republic discussion emphasised correct belief-content, the Laws' discussion emphasises pleasure: a well-educated person sings and dances well, singing and dancing good songs and dances, and above all, takes pleasure in just these songs and dances (hating the other kinds)-the last of these being more important than correctness in voice, body or thinking
These two new emphases in the Laws-on the soul's movements and on pleasure-seem to be related. Although the Athenian describes the young soul as malleable and impressionable (Laws 664a, 666c, 671b-c) as Socrates did in the Republic, he also observes that even very young humans have a sense of order and disorder in movement (653e-54a, 664e-65a); his point seems to be that even though they are disorderly, young souls are already responsive to and appreciative of order. 46 After all, their motion, erratic and disorderly as it is, is just the soul's natural, rational, circular motion disrupted. By contrast in the Republic, young guardians have to be habituated to take pleasure in fine things, and the point of such habituation is to prepare the soul for the development of rational appreciation of these things (401c-2a). In the Laws, the pleasure a young child takes in the orderly movements of choral dancing seems to be evidence that his pre-rational soul itself has been put in a good state-for it. If these thoughts are on the right track, then musical education in the Laws is not a matter of impressing prerational souls with belief-contents which turn out to be appropriate to them only when their rational powers have developed. Instead, the direction of pleasures and pains is a development of proto-rational powers to perceive goodness. Plato does not fault the sophists for undermining the authority of Athenian moral values but rather for being uncritical of these values; I argue that Plato thinks the sophists dangerous because they make it intellectually respectable to seek nothing surer than opinion, and that he responds to this counsel of despair by developing a psychology to show how knowledge is possible.
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8 Hippias draws the nature-convention distinction at Protagoras 337d, but to make peace between Protagoras and Socrates, saying that the assembled wise men, since they are alike in being wise, are kinsmen by nature even though not by convention.
9 Plato does not call Gorgias a sophist, and indeed in the Gorgias Socrates distinguishes sophistic and rhetoric insisting that although alike and often confused, they are different activities, sophistic making itself out to be the craft of legislation and rhetoric the craft of justice (465c). Yet in virtue of their likenesses-making themselves out to be parts of political expertise while in fact aiming at pleasure rather than the good, and guessing rather than knowing (464c-d)-both sophistic and rhetoric are captured by the description of the so-called sophists in the Republic passage quoted above. 10 Irwin, 'Sophists', 586, suggests that Gorgias' On Non-Being could have been written to demonstrate that arguments as rigorous as the Eleatics' could prove conclusions opposite to theirs, the lesson of this being that persuasiveness, the product of rhetoric, should be the ultimate standard of success in speech.
11 So, for example, the Athenians cannot believe that virtue is teachable since they allow any Athenian to advise the assembly about city management even though he cannot point to a teacher who taught him this, whereas in technical matters the assembly listens only to established experts (319d-e). Further supposed evidence of the unteachability of virtue is that good men such as Pericles (whom he calls a gratifier of appetites at Gorgias 517b-c) provide their sons the best possible education and so clearly must value it-and yet fail, themselves and through other teachers, to make these sons good (320b, cf. Meno 93a-94e).
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12 So Protagoras too argues from beliefs implicit in Athenian practice: virtue must be teachable because we are angry at the vicious and punish them to deter them (323d-24a); the practice of punishment for vice requires us to think that virtue is teachable (324a-c);
given the high value of virtue, it must be that everyone tries to teach it to everyone, which would explain why the sons of the virtuous aren't especially virtuous (324d-27c).
13
Cf. Apology 24e-25a, Meno 92d-93a; Pericles' funeral oration describes the city of Athens as a whole as a means for the education of Greece (Thucydides 2.41).
14 So-called after the Muses, a musical education would include learning to sing, to play an instrument, to recite and interpret poetry. 
